ABSTRACT: I investigate the implication of the truth-relativist's alleged 'faultless disagreements 1 ' for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of disagreement the truth-relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally required for either party in a (faultless) disagreement. That the truth-relativists' disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-relativist has actually preserved.
Introduction: Two Debates About Disagreement
Disagreement plays important philosophical roles in current debates in social epistemology and in the philosophy of language, though for very different reasons. In the philosophy of language, arguments from faultless disagreement are used to motivate truth-relativism over contextualism in certain areas of discourse. In social epistemology, disagreement is at the centre of debates between conformists and non-conformists about doxastic revision (in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer). What can these debates learn from each other? This is a largely unexplored question.
My aim here is to develop a particular strand of connection between these debates; specifically, I explore the implications for the debate between conformism and nonconformism in social epistemology if the truth-relativist's picture of disagreement is right.
As we'll see, the implications are more substantial than one might originally suspect.
Toward the end of exploring these implications, I want to first (in §2) give a clear, general picture of the role disagreement plays in arguments for truth relativism, and in §3 I'll outline and discuss just how disagreement over centred content is supposed to work, both in theory in practice. In §4, I'll explain briefly what is at stake between conformists and nonconformists in the epistemology of disagreement, focusing on the role recognized peer 1 Faultless disagreement-style arguments are typically used motivate truth-relativism in various domains of discourse. For canonical presentations of faultless disagreement arguments for truthrelativism, see Kolbel (2003) and MacFarlane (2007) . See also M. Kolbel and M. Garca-Carpintero (Eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, for a collection of recent papers defending and opposing arguments from faultless disagreement. Cf. Cappelen & Hawthorne (2010) for a recent challenge to these arguments, and to truth-relativism more generally. disagreement is supposed to play in doxastic revision. In §5, I'll explore the question of whether centred-content disagreements appealed to by truth-relativists can play the same epistemically significant role with respect to questions about whether doxastic revision is rationally required in the face of such recognized disagreements with epistemic peers.
Truth-relativism, contextualism and disagreement
Considerations to do with disagreement bolster an argument characteristic of a recent wave of what I'll call "New Relativism 2 " in the philosophy of language. New Relativists endorse truth-relativism in certain areas of discourse where the truth of claims seems to depend, as MacFarlane puts it, 'not only on how things are with the objects they explicitly concern, but on how things are with some subject not explicitly mentioned.' Examples of such areas of discourse that have been fertile ground for New Relativists are: predicates of personal taste 3 , epistemic modals 4 , knowledge attributions 5 , future contingents 6 , gradable adjectives 7 and indicative conditionals 8 . The most fertile ground for New Relativism has been discourse involving predicates of personal taste, and for ease of exposition, I'll articulate the truthrelativist's position vis-à-vis this particular area of discourse.
Let P represent the area of discourse that is predicates of personal taste (such as tasty, fun). Truth-relativism with respect to P-utterances claims that (roughly): the truth of one's Putterance depends in part on a context of assessment-the context in which the proposition is being evaluated as true or false. Accordingly, "Miniature golf is fun," does not get a truthvalue simpliciter; it gets a truth value only once, as Lasersohn (2005) puts it, a judge or standards parameter (in the context of evaluation) is specified. And the relevant standard at play in the context of assessment is not uniquely determined by the context of use. As Crispin Wright (2007) has put it: vary [the context of assessment] and the truth value of the utterance can vary, even though the context of its making and the associated state of the world remain fixed. This is a somewhat simplistic view of the truth-relativist position, but it will do for now.
Even the briefest reflection on the implications of truth-relativism reveals the position to constitute a radical departure from orthodoxy. Why exactly would one endorse truth-relativism in any domain of discourse? After all, as Cappelen & Hawthorne (2010) 2 I'm following here Maria Baghramian's (forthcoming) terminology; Cappelen & Hawthorne (2010) refer to this recent movement in analytic philosophy of language "analytic relativism" while Wright (2007) refers to the position as "New Age Relativism." 3 For some defences of truth-relativism about predicates of personal taste, see Lasersohn (2005) , Stephenson (2007) and Kölbel (2003) . Cf. Cappelen & Hawthorne (2010) , Ch. 4, for some recent opposition. 4 See (Egan 2007; Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson 2007; Stephenson 2007 and MacFarlane 2011c) . 5 For defences of truth-relativism about knowledge attributions, see Richard (2004); MacFarlane (2005; . 6 See MacFarlane (2003) . 7 See Richard (2004) . 8 For example, Weatherson (2006) . point out, the idea of the same proposition being true for Sam but not for Dean runs deeply contrary to our ordinary thinking about the contents of thought and talk-particularly, that the objects of thought and talk (i.e. propositions) bear truth and falsity as monadic properties.
There would have to be very good reason to give up this elegant and pre-philosophically intuitive picture.
MacFarlane thinks there are plenty of good reasons, and although he is not by any means the only New Relativist, his defences of truth-relativism across a spectrum of domains of discourse have been the most sophisticated in the literature; accordingly, I'll be considering the role of disagreement in the truth-relativist's argument broadly on MacFarlane's own terms, and again, by focusing on predicates of personal taste (hereafter, P-utterances) as the representative area of discourse-though I will at times use examples from discourse concerning epistemic modals.
As MacFarlane sees things, disagreement and subjectivity are twin desiderata that must be accommodated by any theory of the truth-conditions of P-utterances (and in other domains of discourse where truth-relativism is defended). To be explicit, a theory of the truth-conditions of P-utterances succeeds only if accounting for both Subjectivity: how the truth of P-utterances depends in part on how things are with some subject not explicitly mentioned; and Disagreement: how when some subject A makes a P-utterance "ɸ" and B replies "Not ɸ", this exchange constitutes a genuine disagreement.
Toward this end, the contextualist fares quite well in so far as the goal is to preserve subjectivity. For the contextualist, the proposition "Kalamata olives are tasty", uttered by A, encodes A's standards; accordingly, the proposition expressed by this utterance is (something like) "Kalamata olives are tasty (to A)." This already is a mark in favour of contextualism over invariantist approaches, which fail to account for how "Kalamata olives are tasty" is (when true) true in part due to facts about the utterer's own tastes. The contextualist appears to be in trouble, though, when it comes to the second desiderata: preserving the insight that there can be genuine P-disagreements of the form:
A: ɸ (e.g. Miniature golf is fun) B: ~ ɸ (e.g. Miniature golf is not fun) For the contextualist, A's utterance expresses the proposition that miniature golf is fun to A, while B's assertion expresses the proposition that miniature golf is not fun to B; accordingly, for the contextualist, there is no commonality of content about which A and B disagree. So the contextualist has no way to account for genuine P-disagreements. Or so the argument goes.
As MacFarlane (and the contextualist) recognizes, the contextualist is not dead in the water at this point. Drawing from Lewis (1989) , the contextualist could-following here DeRose (2002)-invoke the shared scoreboard analogy in an effort to save disagreement 9 . On this analogy, the relevant standard in play is whatever standard is operative in the conversational context, and this standard can shift during the course of the conversation as different conversational moves are made. Consider here the case of knowledge-attributions: once (say) a particularly scary sceptical scenario is introduced, the standard operative in the conversational context raises, and claims of the form "S knows p" encode (after the scenario is introduced) that standard; because A and B can coherently assert and deny knowledgeattributions relative to the common standard operant in the conversational context (so long as they are keeping an eye to the scoreboard), we can make sense of A and B genuinely disagreeing.
There are (at least) two problems with this initially promising approach for the contextualist to 'regain' disagreement. The first is that it is not at all clear how the shared scoreboard-strategy-while perhaps plausible in the case of knowledge-attributions and perhaps also in cases of epistemic modals-would work in P-discourse where it's unclear what if any the standard operative in the apparent disagreement would be. Modifying here an example from Cappelen & Hawthorne, suppose Vinny (the vulture) says, "Rotting flesh is delicious!" while Gordon Ramsay replies that it is "(Expletive) terrible!" It is, at best, unclear how, for the contextualist, reference to the shared scoreboard analogy is supposed to save disagreement here. But even if the shared scoreboard strategy could be effectively employed here, a bigger worry looms: as MacFarlane notes, such a strategy could (in principle) only explain only intra-conversational (but not inter-conversational) disagreement.
Here's MacFarlane:
Once the importance of accounting for disagreement has been conceded, one cannot limit oneself to disagreement within conversations. And it is hopeless to widen the bounds of "conversations" as needed to make all disagreement intraconversational. For it is only if conversations are bounded and relatively self-contained that we can really make sense of the idea of a shared scoreboard. (MacFarlane 2007, 7.) Just as there is no apparent 'shared scoreboard' in the cases where P-claims come from wildly different perspectives (as in the case of Vinny and Gordon Ramsay), there's no shared scoreboard when disagreements are interconversational. What, after all, would a shared scoreboard amount to in inter-conversational disagreement?
Here it is worth briefly considering 'Eavesdropper' cases: one subject overhears, and denies, a claim made in a conversational context of which she is not a recognised member.
Eavesdropper cases have been especially forceful in suggesting that the contextualist cannot account for disagreement in cases where the truth of an epistemic modal is at issue (and this has been cited as an argument in favour of truth-relativist semantics for discourse about epistemic modality). A paradigmatic example of a claim expressing an epistemic modal is 9 Cf. Sundell (2011) . Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this reference. the claim A might be F; whether an utterance of this claim is true depends on whether F is an epistemic possibility for some relevant individual or group-that is, F must not be ruled out by what some individual or group knows 10 . As for which individual or group is relevant here, Egan (2011, 2) , and Weatherson & Egan (2012, 4) At this point, the truth-relativist turns a disagreement-based argument against contextualism into a disagreement-based argument for truth-relativism. While the invariantist is equipped to preserve disagreement without subjectivity, and the contextualist seems equipped to preserve subjectivity but not disagreement, the relativist claims you have it both ways: both subjectivity and disagreement. First subjectivity: as Stojanovic (2009, 691) succinctly notes, while the contextualist preserved subjectivity by modelling (for example, with predicates of personal taste) the judge parameter as an implicit argument to the taste predicate, the [truth]-relativist account models it as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation. 12 10 Or, perhaps, by whatever is within an agent's epistemic reach. As Egan (2007, 11) suggests, "It might be the case that P is true iff it's compatible with all of the facts that are within some group's epistemic reach that P, where what it takes to be within one's epistemic reach can vary across contexts. 11 See Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) for further problems for DeRose's speaker inclusion constraint. 12 Since truth-relativism is prominent in both predicates of personal taste and about epistemic modals, let X represent either area of discourse. As MacFarlane puts it, the subjectivity consists in the fact that Whether "John might be at the store" is true, when evaluated by S, depends in part on what S's knowledge rules out; and whether "Roller coasters are fun" is true, as evaluated by S, depends in part on what S judges to be fun 13 . It should be obvious now why, if truthrelativism can also really preserve disagreement (which we'll consider shortly), then the disagreements that are preserved will be faultless: in the Eavesdropper case, while Rodney and I seem to disagree about whether "Purdue might win," neither of us is at fault, or as Kölbel (2003; 2004) puts it, neither of us has "made a mistake." The same would of course be the case with predicates of personal taste, and the fact that neither you nor I seem to be mistaken when asserting and denying (respectively) "Rollercoasters are fun" is an insight Kölbel thinks is both a ubiquitous one and one that only a truth-relativist can preserve.
So subjectivity (and by extension faultlessness, in apparent disagreements) is preserved. But is genuine disagreement really preserved? This is a more complicated question. The first thing the relativist will draw attention to is the sense in which the truthrelativist preserves disagreement "better" than the contextualist. On the surface, this seems right. When Vinny and Gordon Ramsay disagree about whether rotting flesh is delicious, the contextualist, by viewing Vinny and Gordon as expressing propositions that encode their standards, respectively, is forced to say that there is no one proposition Vinny asserts and Gordon denies. Because the truth-relativist preserves subjectivity not by viewing 'delicious' as a hidden indexical, but rather, by including a standards parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, the truth-relativist allows Vinny and Gordon to affirm and deny the same standards-neutral proposition (i.e. Rotting flesh is delicious), respectively.
Two things should now be obvious: firstly, that if we can't make sense of genuine disagreement about the sort of content the truth-relativist claims is being 'disagreed upon,' then the motivation for endorsing truth-relativism over contextualism (across the domains of discourse where truth-relativism stakes its claim) is vitiated. Truth-relativism fails to account for disagreement if what it accounts for isn't genuine disagreement. Secondly, it should be obvious that the interesting ramification for debates in social epistemology (specifically, in the epistemology of disagreement) will be whether doxastic revision in the face of truth-relativist-style disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer is something that we can make sense of as ever being rationally required. If not, truth-relativist disagreement would seem to lack the sort of epistemic significance disagreements as such are supposed to the 'X-neutral' proposition (i.e. "John might be at the store" or "Roller coasters are fun") which A asserts and B denies has a truth value only relative to an assessment parameter; as such, either of these propositions can be true for A and false for B. Subjectivity is preserved then because it is preserved that the truth of these claims depends in part on how things are for some agent not explicitly mentioned. 13 This is somewhat oversimplistic; as Lasersohn (2005) points out, in discourse about predicates of personal taste, we can distinguish between autocentric and exocentric perspectives, the latter of which will be ones where we the relevant standards at play in the context of evaluation will be the standards of someone other than the asserter. Consider, for example, a case where a man (having taken his 5-year-old to the carnival) says to his wife (in the presence of his son), that the "The rollercoaster was fun, but and other kiddie rides weren't fun." have. We'll engage with this latter issue after more carefully assessing the nature of truthrelativist disagreement. Lewis (1980) and Kaplan (1989) showed that truth can be relative to a context of evaluation that includes world, time and location parameters. As Kaplan (particularly in his work on indexicals) showed us, the need for particular parameters in the circumstance of evaluation is a function of the non-specificity of certain propositional contents with respect to world, time and location. Here's Kaplan:
Centred-content disagreement, and the practice of challenging assertions
"A circumstance will usually include a possible state or history of the world, a time, and perhaps other features as well. The amount of information we require from a circumstance is linked to the degree of specificity of contents and thus to the kinds of operators in the language... (1989: 502, my italics) MacFarlane, as well as Cappelen and Hawthorne 14 , view truth-relativism as expanding on this insight, by 'proliferating' the parameters in the circumstances of evaluation to include (as Cappelen & Hawthorne (2010, 10) put it), 'exotic parameters'. Here's MacFarlane's own characterisation of this sort of parameter proliferation (which corresponds with a widening of the contents that are, for some parameter α, 'α -neutral':
Taking this line of thought a little farther, the relativist might envision contents that are "sense-of-humor neutral" or "standard-of-taste" neutral" or "epistemic-state" neutral,"
and circumstances of evaluation that include parameters for a sense of humor, a standard of taste or an epistemic state. This move would open up room for the truth value of a proposition to vary with these "subjective" factors in much the same way that it varies with the world of evaluation. The very same proposition--say, that apples are delicious--could be true with respect to one standard of taste, false with respect to another." (MacFarlane 2007: 6-7) What do two people disagree about when disagreeing about a (for example) 'standard-of-taste-neutral' proposition? Such a proposition is what some refer to a centred proposition, which-following Egan-is true only relative to a triple that includes <world, 14 In their monograph-length argument against truth-relativism (which they call 'analytic relativism'), Cappelen & Hawthorne write: "Contemporary Analytic relativists reason as follows: 'Lewis and Kaplan have shown that we need to relativize truth to triples of <world, time, location>. Hence in a way, anyone who follows Lewis and Kaplan is already a relativist. There are only truth and falsity relative to settings along these three parameters, and so there is no such thing as truth simpliciter. But, having already started down this road, why not exploit these strategies further? In particular, by adding new and exotic parameters into the circumstances of evaluation, we can allow the contents of thought and talk to be non-specific (in Kaplan's sense) along dimensions other than world, time and location, " (2009: 10 This is a tenuous predicament for the truth relativist, and MacFarlane knows it. 16 Accordingly, MacFarlane rejects the simple view of disagreement according to which A and B disagree if there is a proposition p that A accepts and B rejects. The simple view (vis-à-vis centred content) really doesn't seem to capture genuine disagreement. Ragnar Francén, when critiquing Kölbel's contention to the contrary, puts the worry well:
Kölbel is right that on his view, when Kant says that punishing innocent Irwin is wrong and Smart says that this is not so, the propositions they assert cannot both be true at one circumstance of evaluation (moral perspective). But this does not mean that they disagree. In analogy with Jane's and June's assertions, Smart's and Kant's assertions concern different circumstances of evaluation, different moral perspectives. It might very well be that they agree that punishing innocent Irwin is wrong at Kant's moral perspective and that punishing innocent Irwin is not wrong at Smart's moral perspective. (Francén 2008 , 112, cited also in Dreier 2009 .
MacFarlane himself, in rejecting that two people disagree just so long as there is a proposition that one accepts and the other rejects, offers a more sophisticated accuracybased account of disagreement, supplemented by a formal account of accuracy:
There is a proposition that one party accepts and the other rejects, and (ii)
The acceptance and the rejection cannot both be accurate (as assessed from C).
I will spare the details here of MacFarlane's account of perspectival accuracy on which this account of disagreement is premised 17 . This is because, given what MacFarlane ultimately concedes about his account, we can set aside the matter of whether the account is 15 Perhaps as sensible as it is to debate what fixes the judge parameter when it's you that is evaluating the proposition; and so, perhaps as sensible as debating what your own standards are. Well, we could play this game. I shout, "It is throbby in here," and you challenge. You assess "It is throbby in here" from your own perspective and, pain free, find it badly defective (inaccurate); you find you were entitled to your challenge. I now roll my eyes, place my head in my hands, grope around for Ibuprofen, thus demonstrating that from my perspective my assertion was entirely accurate; I have successfully (from my perspective) met the challenge. We could play this game. But it would be a bad game. Dreier (2009, 102-3 ) goes on to suggest that not only is this a bad game, but even worse, perhaps a nonsensical game.
The game as we were playing it seems not to make any kind of conversational sense at all. In this way it is quite different from other kinds of pointless conversational games we might play… [other pointless games] are conversationally intelligible even if their critics are right about their pointlessness. When you say that human beings are fourdimensional and I say we are three dimensional, this at least makes sense as a disagreement even if there isn't anything either of us can say to budge the other form his position… but when I insist that it is throbby in here and you reply that it isn't the least bit throbby, all that is happening is that I have a headache, and you do not, and we both know this… and there is no intelligible sense in which we disagree. Perhaps Dreier is right that these faultless 'disagreements' are nonsensical, perhaps he's not.
They do seem to be practically pointless, and for good reason: the alleged disagreement here lacks any epistemically significance for either party. Genuine disagreements are hardly pointless in practice in part because they serve the function of playing epistemically significant roles in social-epistemic practice, as we'll see in §4. In §5, we'll consider whether truth-relativist disagreement can play the sort of epistemically significant role genuine disagreements are taken to play.
Disagreement in social epistemology: conformism versus non-conformism
Is the mere fact that you and I disagree about p epistemically significant in the following way: if I previously believed p, and then find out that you believe ~p, I am rationally required to revise (i.e lower the degree of my belief 19 ) my belief that p? A quick and easy answer is 'no', if I (for example) know that my evidence is better than yours, or perhaps, I
know that you are delusional, or in some way cognitively defective on the matter at hand.
Such asymmetry with respect to our epistemic standings to p prior to disagreement is enough to make our disagreement epistemically insignificant with respect to whether, On my usage, you count your friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about to-bejudged claim if and only if you think that, conditional on the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. Elga (2007, 487) And once this is supposed, as Elga (2007, 478) sees it, the rational thing to do is straightforward: you should give [the recognised epistemic peer's] conclusions the same weight as your own. Here's Elga:
Suppose that before evaluating a claim, you think that you and your friend are equally likely to evaluate it correctly. When you find out that your friend disagrees with your verdict, how likely should you think it that you are correct? The equal weight view says: 50%.
Elga's is a strong view of conformism. More moderate versions of conformism will require some doxastic revision in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer.
David Christensen (2007, 4) Kelly (2005); van Inwagen (1996) ). Non-conformists, specifically, reject the view that one is rationally required to revise one's belief in the face of recognised peer disagreement, and consequently, unlike the conformist, allow for the possibility of rational or reasonable peer disagreement. Who's right, the conformist or the non-conformist?
As literature over the past five years has shown 22 , there is no quick and easy answer.
Offering one is more than I want to attempt here. However, I do want to draw attention, as Lackey has, to the fact that certain cases are typically adduced in favour of the conformist and certain others in favour of the non-conformist. But this very fact, I think, supports Lackey's contention that we have some reason to reject the following sort of principle, which A rather wide class of cases that has been popular among conformists is the (broad) class of cases that include disagreements between recognised epistemic peers concerning controversial subject matter. 25 Let's say a subject matter S is controversial to the extent that epistemic peers tend to disagree in that area 26 . Such areas include exclude (for instance) basic arithmetic, the current time, physical laws, geography, and to a large extent empirical science and include (among other areas) politics, religion, philosophy and-most relevant for our purposes-claims of taste.
It should be uncontroversial that claims characteristic of these areas are controversial, and apparent disagreement about them is rampant. One might be tempted to reflect, though, on this last suggestion and point out: "While it's fair enough to imagine A and B as 23 An example of a case that would plausibly support a non-conformist approach would be one where the previously recognized epistemic peer disagrees with you about something for which your epistemic justification is overwhelming, direct and immediate. For example, suppose 24 See Lackey's "A Justificationist Account of the Epistemic Significance of Peer Disagreement." 25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out that controversial issues have formed some of the core examples for all participants in the literature on peer disagreement, whatever their preferred view. Perhaps this is, to some degree, a result of non-conformists attempting to meet the challenge posed by conformists, when the challenge is presented vis-à-vis controversial subject matter (a la Feldman). However, as the reviewer points out, this isn't always the case. Whether and to what extent controversial subject matter is comparatively more fertile ground for the conformist than for the nonconformist is an interesting philosophical question in its own right. For the present purposes, I do not need to weigh in here; my position depends only on the weaker claim that controversial subject matter is typically used to support the non-conformist verdict, and this is so regardless of whether non-conformists appeal in some cases to similar kinds of cases. 26 Another perhaps equally plausible characterization is: a subject matter is controversial to the extent that the relevant experts in that subject matter disagree about propositions central to that subject matter. Plausibly, in practice, these characterisations will pick out the same subject matter. Even if not, either sufficiently picks out claims of taste as controversial subject matter. epistemic peers engaged in a disagreement about politics or philosophy, it's not clear how A and B could be epistemic peers with respect to some taste-claim. People can disagree about taste claims, but never as epistemic peers." In reply, we may point out: for anything two people can disagree about, they can disagree about as epistemic peers and potentially recognise each other as such (and so the doxastic revision issues between conformists and non-conformists arise). After all, if A and B disagree about whether P is true, then (prior to the disagreement), along dimensions of intellectual ability vis-à-vis determining whether p and evidence vis-à-vis p, one of the three situations will be the case:
A is in a better epistemic position along these dimensions for determining whether p, and so A is B's epistemic superior;
(ii) B is in a better epistemic position along these dimensions for determining whether p than A, and so A is B's epistemic inferior; If not, though, the faultless-disagreement-style cases to which truth-relativists appeal fail to have the sort of epistemic significance disagreements (qua disagreements) are supposed to have in social epistemology. Plausibly, an account of disagreement must be amenable to accounts of the characteristic roles disagreements play in practice, including their epistemic roles. To the extent that faultless disagreement (as championed by the truthrelativist) fails to play such a role, there is reason to cast doubt on the matter of whether these are disagreements at all. And if they are not, then all the worse for the truth-relativist, who-as we saw in §2-loses traction against the contextualist to the extent that 27 See fn. 25. Also, thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out that, in aesthetic disputes particularly, a non-conformist position could be potentially be motivated in part by considering that disputants behave in practice as though non-conformism were correct. Does the fact that disputants act as though non-conformism is true (by in fact holding their guns) in area X favour non-conformism in area X as a position about the rationality of doxastic revision in area X? It's not clear that it does any more than it suggests, as Feldman would contend, that most disputants hold their guns unreasonably in these areas. disagreement is lost. Taking a step back, it should be clear now why the relationship between disagreement in the philosophy of language and social epistemology is actually something on which a good deal hangs.
That said, let's consider one more avenue of resistance to the inter-debate gambit I've sketched for truth-relativist disagreement: suppose one denies that (in the arena of claims of taste) there could be recognised peer disagreement because there is no proper disagreement at all in this area because, for example, disagreement over centred content isn't genuine disagreement, or, following the expressivist, such claims express attitudes and are not truthapt in a way that allows for genuine disagreement (thus nor recognised peer disagreement)).
To this line, we may reply: perhaps that's right. Maybe there is no genuine disagreement at all when A says "This is tasty" and B says "This is not tasty. 28 " But no position has been taken here. To be clear: what I'm interested in is how to make sense of the social-epistemic side of disagreement if we take the truth-relativist at her word. The truth relativist tells us (emphatically, in debates with the contextualist) that these are disagreements. And as I've suggested, for any p, if two people can disagree about whether p, they can do so as recognised epistemic peers. And if they do so as epistemic peers, then if the debate is in an area apposite to conformism, truth-relativist-style disagreement had better be such that we can make sense of being rationally required to revise our beliefs in light of recognised (truthrelativist) peer disagreement. Let's turn now to the question of whether such sense can be made.
Truth-relativist disagreement and doxastic revision
Let F be the claim "Bob Saget is funny," sincerely expressed by Libby. Libby says "F," and Libby's respected colleague, Eunice, who typically shares Libby's sense of humour, replies with ~F.
As the truth-relativist tells us, "F"-that is, "Bob Saget is funny"-is true for Libby and false for Eunice. They also tell us it is a disagreement. If it is a disagreement, then it should play the relevant epistemic role that disagreements play in social epistemology. Since any disagreement about whether p can in principle be a disagreement individuals approach as epistemic peers vis-à-vis p, and since this particular subject matter is one that plausibly squares with conformism as an approach to epistemic peer-disagreement, the truth-relativist owes us an explanation for the following, supposing Libby and Eunice are recognised epistemic peers vis-à-vis F:
(R) Rationality requires that, if Libby and Eunice disagree about whether F and are mutually recognised epistemic peers vis-à-vis F, then in light of the fact that they disagree vis-à-vis F, each should revise her respective belief about whether F.
As we noted in §4 in considering Elga's presentation of the motivations for conformism, a principle like (R) is premised upon a related principle about recognised epistemic peerhood, call it (EP):
(EP) If A and B are recognised epistemic peers vis-à-vis F, then rationality requires that A and B think, before disagreeing about F, that each other is equally likely to be right about whether F.
If the truth relativist is to make sense of (R), the truth relativist must be able to make sense of (EP). Can the truth-relativist make sense of ( Importantly, no. For the truth relativist, the connection between epistemic peerhood and likelihood of getting it right breaks down. This is because cognitive equality and evidential equality don't entail standards equality, and standards equality is just as relevant to getting it right, for the truth-relativist. (After all, the sort of claims being disagreed about are true relative not only to the state of the world but also to the evaluator's standard). So the truthrelativist can't coherently endorse (EP), but without endorsing (EP), it's unclear how the truth-relativist is supposed to make sense of (R It may seem obvious that upon such a discovery I should at the very least reduce my confidence level in P by some significant amount, if not withhold belief entirely or move closer to her view than my old view. (Frances 2012, 2) Whether doxastic revision is rationally required in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer has generated much more discussion than the same question regarding epistemic superiors, because-with epistemic superiors-the question seems to be 'how much' doxastic revision is rationally required, rather than 'whether' it is required. If things were otherwise, we would have a hard time explaining why it is irrational (all things equal) to be doxastically unmoved by the testimony of experts 29 . In the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic superior, it is prima facie plausible to suppose you are rationally required not only to revise your belief, or to withhold, but to positively move your credence towards the view of the expert. Because this last bit is somewhat controversial 30 , let's suppose something considerably weaker, and so:
(R*) Rationality requires that, if A and B disagree about whether p and B is A's recognised epistemic superior vis-à-vis p, then in light of the fact that they disagree vis-à-vis p, A should (to some extent) revise her respective belief about whether p.
And (R*) is premised upon something like:
(EP*) If B is A's recognised epistemic superior vis-à-vis p, then rationality requires that A think, before disagreeing about p, that A is (at least somewhat) more likely to be right about p than B.
It would be quite bad if the truth-relativist's faultless disagreements were not compatible with (R*). But truth-relativist disagreement is compatible with (R*) only if compatible with EP*. But truth-relativists disagreements are not even in principle compatible with EP*. This is because cognitive superiority (vis-à-vis p) and evidential superiority (vis-à-vis p) don't entail standards superiority (or even standards equality) vis-à-vis p, and standards (which fix the judge parameter) are just as relevant to getting it right, for the truth-relativist.
One might balk and suppose that that no two individuals can enter into a taste agreement where one is an epistemic superior, and so the worry that truth-relativists can't preserve EP* (and R*) regarding taste disagreements is circumvented. But this worry can be countered the same way we countered the same worry mutatis mutandis for epistemic peers.
The reply is that, if A and B genuinely disagree about whether something is so, then they may or may not be symmetrical with respect to their cognitive abilities and evidence that are relevant to determining whether p. If a faultless disagreement is a disagreement, then qua disagreement, it should (in a context where there is stark asymmetry between A and B along cognitive and evidential dimensions vis-à-vis p) be epistemically significant. But such disagreements never will be.
Conclusion
29 Consider here Elga's (2007, 479 ) discussion of epistemic superiority in a weather forecasting case: "How, exactly, should we be guided by outside opinions?... Start with the simplest case: complete deference. When it comes to the weather, I completely defer to the opinions of my local weather forecaster .My probability for rain, given that her probability for rain is 60%, is also 60%." 30 Cf. Frances
Although disagreement plays (very) different roles in debates in the philosophy of language and in social epistemology, these debates could stand to learn from each other, and I hope to have drawn attention to one important point of connection. In particular, I've suggested that any attempt to 'save' disagreement by the truth-relativists in the philosophy of language should aspire to save something capable of playing the characteristically epistemically significant role disagreement is supposed to play in social-epistemic practice; I've given reason to doubt that the sort of disagreement the truth-relativist appeals to as an advantage over the contextualist could ever play such an epistemically significant role.
I leave open whether the worry I raise is sufficient for rejecting truth-relativism, allthings-considered; I insist only that we should be sceptical of any argument for truthrelativism that relies on premises that suggest the truth-relativist has preserved disagreement. From the perspective of social epistemology, it seems the epistemic significance of disagreement is preserved by the truth-relativist no better than by the contextualist, and this should be concerning for the truth-relativist.
Plausibly, the issue examined here is but one of many points of connection between disagreement in social epistemology and the philosophy of language, and it would benefit both debates if more points of connection were explored.
